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Disturbing Binaries in Political Thought: Silence as Political Activism 
Summary  
 
‘Keeping silent’ can be a meaningful political event, a form of political activism that 
generates new political subjectivities and alters existing realities by reconfiguring power 
relations. To flesh out this argument, this paper attends to a particular silent protest and 
affirms it as a tactic employed by an emergent political collectivity to make itself 
perceptible, declare an injustice and challenge institutional power. As such, the silent 
event under scrutiny does not merely invite a turning of our attention to a practice that 
breaks the association of the political subject with the speaking subject; it also invites a 
reconsideration of what we are accustomed to accept as political activism. ‘Keeping silent’ 
is a critical practice, indeed, because it manifests an alternative possibility of being and 
acting; in so doing, it disrupts established patterns of thought and practice, and more 
specifically the rigid distinction between speech and silence.   
 
Keywords: dualism; de Certeau; activism; non-violent movements; democracy  
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‘ 
‘If you want something, you better make some noise’ 
Malcolm X 
Introduction 
The study of political activism has long achieved to challenge the speech-centered 
tradition of political thought, manifested in influential approaches such as the deliberative 
turn (eg Dryzek 2000), discourse ethics (Habermas 1984, 1998), and even in more radical 
approaches to communicative democracy (eg Young 1996). Rather, recent studies of 
social movements draw our attention to non-verbal forms of political engagement. Such 
instances are the shift of emphasis from speech to the body which, using the framework of 
performance studies, points to performative acts as means of making politics happen (see, 
for example, Caster, 2004; Lichtenfels and Rouse, 2013; Madison, 2010); the study of 
image events staged by activist groups for mass media dissemination, which enlarge our 
understanding of audience creation and political argumentation through political activism 
(DeLuca, 1999); and the consideration of profound encounters, such as flavor, which turn 
parts of the body, such as the mouth, to organs of political action, interrupting our 
conventional perception of political activism (Panagia, 2009). The performing subject; the 
image-creating subject; the tasting subject: political subjectivities that transcend the image 
of the political subject as speaking subject and render perceptible alternative ways of 
appearing in public and acting politically.    
 
The silent subject is yet another appearance of the political subject which has received 
relatively limited attention. This is not to suggest that the issue of silence as a mode of 
political engagement lacks attention in social and political thought; a number of thinkers 
scrutinize the diverse manifestations of silence in public life and expose the polysemy that 
characterizes this mode of action (eg Ferguson 2003; Zumbrunnen, 2008; Göker 2011, 
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Jungkurz 2012, Whitehead and Bowman, 2012; Dobson, 2014). Rather, this is to point 
both to the limited attention that silence has received compared to speech and, more 
particularly, to the lack of scrutiny of the practice of ‘keeping silent’ as political tactic and 
therefore as a certain form of protest and activism that channels political demands. A 
possible explanation is that its effectiveness as political intervention depends upon the 
circumstances amidst which it emerges; tactical silence is situational, it is informed and 
sustained by kairos. Under certain circumstances, this paper argues, a silent protest can 
be a productive force that generates new political subjectivities and reconfigures existing 
power relations. In this case, it is a critical practice that invites a turning of our attention to 
modes of political engagement that transcend the threshold of speech and expand the 
perceived range of activism.  
 
This paper attends to a silent protest that took place at the University of California, 
Davis in 2011 and proposes that we can attend to this practice of dissent as a tactical and 
critical political practice. As such, ‘keeping silent’ is a meaningful act not merely in that it 
brings about political change, but also because it disrupts the primacy of language as 
means of communication of political demands, as well as the association of political 
participation with speaking. Affirming the importance of tactical and critical silence, the 
paper suggests, we deepen our understanding of what counts as political engagement, 
whereas we also broaden our acknowledgment of the role of non-verbal practices as forms 
of activism. The paper, then, not only responds to the call to ‘find ways of incorporating 
silence to the political process’ (Dobson, 2014, 99); it also aspires to provide a theoretical 
framework for disturbing the prevalence of binary oppositions in our thought and 
particularly that of speech/silence. It does so by demonstrating how rich practices such as 
‘keeping silent’ blur the rigid distinction between pairs of concepts such as silence/ 
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speech, and resist the sharp categorizations following stark dichotomizations. Political 
practice resists rigorous theorization.   
The aim of the paper, therefore, is threefold: first, it points to the tactical nature of the 
practice of ‘keeping silent’ and therefore its relevance to the particular occasion or kairos; 
second, it shows how this is also a critical practice, one that contributes towards the 
deepening of our understanding of political engagement, by drawing our attention away 
from electoral processes, community politics and consumer boycotts and towards less 
noticed yet no less important aspects of political activism; and third, it illustrates how 
political practice disturbs the binary logic implicated in political thought. The event at UC 
Davis curves a place for under-theorized aspects of political engagements in our political 
thinking, demonstrating how - under certain circumstances - the silent subject can be a 
political subject and that ‘keeping silent’ is not the opposite of argumentative practice. 
What is perceivable as political participation can occasionally be less noticeable, yet 
equally eloquent and important to an articulated political claim.   
        
Making Sense of the Silent Protest at UC Davis 
A woman walks down a paved path, arms crossed over her chest, as if she is protecting it, 
shoulders curved forwards. She looks weakened and puzzled, a bit worried as she passes 
through hundreds of young people who form the path. They remain seated on the ground, 
silent, as she moves surrounded by cameras clicking. A sense of embarrassment, 
perhaps; an eerie moment, for sure. It is this silent way that students at the University of 
California, Davis chose to express their disdain for Chancellor Linda B. Katehi and her 
refusal to resign after the relevant call from the school’s faculty association.i  
 
This relatively unknown story is linked to the more popular event that took place on 
November 18, 2011 when campus police pepper-sprayed a group of students who 
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protested against budget cuts and tuition hikes. The students, members of the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, chanted ‘You use weapons! We use our voice!’ seated on a paved 
path in the campus quad, when a police officer used pepper-spray against them (Cherkis, 
2011). Following the event, a campaign was started against Chancellor Katehi, holding her 
responsible for the outbreak of violence on the behalf of the campus police and calling her 
to resign, a call that she refused. The day after the pepper-spray event Chancellor Katehi, 
following a press conference, remained inside one of the University buildings amid safety 
concerns, since the building was surrounded by students who were protesting against her 
decision to confront non-violent protesters with violence (Horowitz, 2013). Even though 
reportedly students for hours chanted things like ‘we are peaceful’ and ‘just walk home’, 
Katehi did not leave the building in what can be seen as an effort to give the impression 
that the students were somehow holding her hostage.ii When after several hours she 
decided to walk out, the students sat down, locked their hands and formed the silent ‘walk 
of shame’, down which Katehi walked. Reporters asked Katehi whether she still felt 
threatened by the students, a sign that further enhances the hypothesis that she had 
created the impression that she was afraid of a violent response on behalf of the students.  
Although the pepper-spray incident traveled around the world through the news, the 
silent protest against the Chancellor received relatively little attention. Perhaps this mere 
fact indicates that we are more familiar with voice, and with news associated with it, rather 
than listening to silence, to that which remains more difficult to perceive and explain. How 
are we to make sense of an event like the one that took place at UC Davis, then? I 
suggest we cannot, if by ‘making sense’ we mean to fit it within established models of 
political analysis. The reason is that the particular event comes to interrupt our senses and 
by doing so it invites a reconfiguring of our associational lives (Panagia, 2009, 3). It is this 
very disruption, this reconfiguration and the way it disarranges established power relations 
that needs to be scrutinized.  
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The disruptive nature of the silent protest at UC Davis lies in the tactical and critical 
character of the students’ intervention. A protest is a priori a form of nonroutinised action 
(Della-Porta and Diani, 2006, 165). It is a performative attempt to persuasion. But a silent 
protest as the one under scrutiny here, more specifically, is disruptive not merely in that it 
interferes with routine or everydayness, but primarily in that it challenges established 
power relations and provokes a turning of our attention when and where we encounter it 
as the unexpected alternative.  Not that staged silent protests are rare in political life; for 
certain activist groups they are an established practice to convey messages, protest 
injustices and forward demands.iii But the aspect of silent political activism that I thematize 
here resists the appropriation of what counts not only as activism, but also as 
argumentation, due to the way it relates to kairos. To deploy silence in the place of the 
chant ‘we use our voice!’, is not to refuse to communicate; rather, it is a very means for 
communicating resistance by proclaiming an injustice to a superior part. Silence is not 
political in itself, but it can produce political effects if exploited tactically and critically in 
certain contexts; as form of protest, silence has a situational character. 
 ‘Keeping silent’ is a transformative practice. For instance, as the audience of the 
protest, of the performative event, our attention and perception is disrupted and altered, 
since we encounter a newly established political reality. A silent protest creates a 
spectacle and therefore a space for intervention that calls for attention. In this sense it is a 
form of staged activism that transcends the confinement of communication of political 
messages to speech acts and of argumentation to the utterance of logical premises and 
conclusions. Like any staged performance, it ‘makes the audience a social body joined in 
affect’ (Caster, 2004, 107), it creates and transforms audiences that are hospitable to the 
changes that the performance seeks to bring about. As Delicath and Deluca (2003) show, 
such dramatic acts of protest do not just challenge norms as to what constitutes 
acceptable means of communication; they also broaden the scope of participation in the 
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public sphere to include subaltern counterpublics; they create opportunities for debate; 
and they animate the possibilities for public discourse and therefore expand 
argumentation.  
 One way to ‘make sense’ of the event at UC Davis, then, is by understanding it as a 
dramatic act of protest. Indeed, it broadens the scope of political communication and 
engagement by expanding our understanding of argumentation beyond verbal forms, 
inviting us to receive the students’ silence as their way to proclaim an injustice and forward 
a political claim. However, this event also brings to our attention the situational, tactical 
and critical character of political activism. Consequently, it disrupts the binary logic 
according to which political freedom is attained through participation expressed with the 
use of voice; the absence of the latter does not preclude the possibility of declaring an 
injustice. The appearance of silence in public life resists single interpretations and opens 
up possibilities for new understandings of the political. In the following section I visit some 
of these appearances, in order to mark out the space for ‘keeping silent’ as political tactic 
that the event at UC Davis illustrates.  
  
The Polysemy of Silence  
The attempt to affirm the practice of ‘keeping silent’ as a form of political engagement and 
therefore as a means to create and project a sense of collectivity, brings to one’s attention 
the fluid and polyvalent essence of silence. Studies in the fields of rhetoric, linguistics and 
communications have long supported the case for the richness and complexity of silence 
as cultural and communication phenomenon (see Tannen and Saville-Troike, 1985).  
Silence is not only the result of imposition, exclusion or denial to participate; it is also 
‘symbolic’, ‘rhetorical’, ‘empowering’, ‘engaging’ (Glenn, 2004). Silence can be as powerful 
as speech, it can deliver meaning and function ‘as a constellation of symbolic strategies 
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that (like spoken language) serves many functions’ (Glenn, 2004, xi). Yet, as Glenn’s study 
demonstrates, silence is open to multiple interpretations and functions.   
 Political theorists are also aware of the polysemy of silence. Ferguson (2003), for 
example, explicitly argues that silence functions ‘in multiplicitous, fragmentary, even 
paradoxical ways’, being thus irreducible ‘to any particular political functionality’ (Ferguson, 
2003, 58). He also points to the inherent power of silence, ‘whether as a form of 
subjugation, resistance, or motivation’ (Ferguson, 2003, 50), as well as to its dual 
constitutive function: on the one hand, it creates identities and enables communities, on 
the other it disrupts organization. In politics, there is no definitive power or role for silence; 
its overlapping dynamics ‘can be iterated, investigated, and explored, but they cannot be 
fixed or predetermined’ (Ferguson, 2003, 62). Any attempt to attend to silence as form of 
activism needs to affirm this fluidity of silence.   
 Zumbrunnen (2008) makes us aware of how a certain appearance of silence, namely 
that of the Athenian demos in Thucydides’ History, stand as forms of political participation. 
The demos, Zumbrunnen argues, is not ‘simply a collection of those who might speak but 
don’t’, but rather is the subject of a ‘collective silence’ (2008, 8). The latter is a power of 
the demos. Thus understood, silence deserves attention in its own terms, that is not as the 
result of exclusion, neither as the result of engaged listening and yet nor as the expression 
of a ‘tacit consent’, and therefore of disempowerment or irrelevance. Rather, such a 
‘collective silence’ ought to be seen as a form of meaningful power of the demos, one that 
blurs the established nexus of power between ordinary citizens and elites by intervening or 
even interrupting the rhetoric of the latter. Silence provides ordinary citizens with a means 
of resistance, at least to the degree that it renders them unknowable to their leaders. 
‘Keeping silent’ is a way to resist mechanisms of power and project a collectivity which 
emerges to respond to a proclaimed injustice.  
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In yet another work, Jungkurz (2012) explores the diverse ways in which silence can be 
mobilized and practiced democratically. He also points to the polysemy of silence by 
distinguishing between four ‘insubordinate silences’, each with a distinct function: 
empowerment, protest, resistance and refusal. Jungkurz classifies the silent event at UC 
Davis as ‘silence that protests’ and therefore as a ‘powerful expression of dissent in social 
and political contexts where speech seems pervasive’ (Jungkurz, 2012, 138). I concur with 
him that the silence at UC Davis profoundly challenges the pervasion of speech in political 
life. But I am also interested here in stressing the situational, tactical and critical nature of 
silent protest, as well as its force in forwarding a political message. Unlike the works of 
Jungkurz and Ferguson, this paper does not aim at offering a fine theoretical classification 
of appearances of silence in public life (they both fill in this gap in political thought 
compellingly); rather, like Zumbrunnen, I am interested in a very particular manifestation of 
silence: that as tactical and critical practice that proclaims injustice.    
 What all these theorists demonstrate is that silence is polysemic; it operates on different 
levels, degrees and dimensions. This is why, I propose, it is situational: its functions and 
effects can only be understood when placed in the wider context amidst which silence 
emerges. As Norval observes, silence has many modalities and we should investigate 
each of them if we are to understand its political capacity (2007, 210). ‘Keeping silent’ as 
political activism is merely one among the many manifestations of silence in public life; to 
suggest that it is a tactical practice is to affirm it as embedded in the circumstances amidst 
which it rearranges and reconstitutes power relations. Against cynics who dismiss quiet 
forms of political enactment as lacking dynamism and thus as ineffective, a silent protest is 
a certain appearance of resistance and power; as such it can produce significant 
pragmatic effects, as the UC Davis case illustrates.iv Democracy has a tactical dimension 
and indeed one that creates new subjectivities, spaces for action and power relations. 
Ultimately, this tactical dimension potentially disturbs established associations, such as of 
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political activism with particular forms of intervention, or of meaningful argumentation with 
utterance. A silent protest is neither denial of communication, as in the case of 
insubordinate silences (Dobson, 2014, 61), nor the absence of political argument.  
  
‘Keeping Silent’ as Political Tactic 
 
A silent protest can be seen as a political tactic. However, the density, complexity and 
obscurity of silence, evidenced by the work of the thinkers discussed in the previous 
section, invites our attention to the wider context, to the events that frame a silent protest. 
In other words, the polysemy of silence brings to our attention the kairos, the opportune 
time or the occasion amidst which a silent event emerges. ‘Keeping silent’, then, works as 
a particular response to an exigence: it is an embedded event that responds to a 
challenge. It is the particular circumstances, the kairos, that invite agents to choose to 
‘keep silent’.      
 To attend to the kairos that frames the protest is to consider the power relations 
implicated in the event and the way the latter reconfigure them. Both Ferguson and 
Jungkurz discuss the multifaceted politics of silence, demonstrating not only how the 
silence of the powerful is different from that of the powerless, and therefore how 
empowering forms of silence differ from disempowering forms of silence, but also how 
certain appearances of silence function ‘as one among other weapons of the weak’ 
(Jungkurz, 2012, 135). I also affirm here silence as a weapon of the weak, but I follow a 
different theoretical trajectory to make this case, not least because I am also interested in 
the effects of this particular practice on the participants and on the kairos. Both are 
transformed through silence; ‘keeping silent’ as political tactic enters a reality and changes 
it.   
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Who is to be understood as ‘the weak’? Certainly, we need to distinguish between ‘the 
weak’ in the more enduring and historical sense and ‘the weak’ in the more fluid and highly 
contextual sense (Jungkurz, 2012, 135). The students at UC Davis are relatively privileged 
compared to, say, students at Garissa University in Kenya or young people who don’t have 
access to tertiary education. Yet, in the particular context of the kairos, of the encounter 
under scrutiny, the students are identified with ‘the weak’ party, given their subordinated 
position in light of the presence of police forces that exercise physical violence, but also 
compared to the powerful institutional position of the Chancellor. The silent protest, 
though, disrupts this particular equilibrium of power and allows a reconfiguration of who is 
‘the weak’.   
In the event at UC Davis, a person(ality) with institutional power is confronted by a 
demos, a collectivity of (anonymous) students with no formal power who, nonetheless, 
succeed in challenging the named person and the institutional power she embodies. At the 
same time, the students also challenge the attempt of those holding institutional power to 
present them as resentful and revengeful. The silent demos employed the tactic of 
‘keeping silent’ in order to declare the double injustice made against them: the unfair 
treatment of the students by the campus police and the equally unfair attempt to attribute 
students a specific identity, to present them as a mob in a fury that is inclined towards 
violence. In other words, ‘keeping silent’ was employed in order to bring about change, a 
change in our perception of the students as being of a certain kind. The students 
established an alternative order: another ‘partition of the sensible’ (Rancière, 1999, 24). 
 The silent protest not only responds directly to the kairos or the circumstances that 
invited it; it also enters and shapes this particular occasion. ‘Keeping silent’ can be a form 
of exercising power on an occasion. At UC Davis, the exigence was indeed modified, not 
only because the injustice was declared, Katehi was humiliated and compensation was 
attributed to the students. The situation was also modified in so far as the act of the 
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students gave rise to a new political subjectivity, a new (silent) demos. The event got the 
students noticed, as ‘the part-taking that renders perceptible what had previously been 
insensible’ (Panagia, 2009, 3). At the same time, it created a new audience, a recipient of 
the argument that the students invented; by ‘keeping silent’ the students invited their 
spectators to affirm them as peaceful, injured, yet powerful.  
 To choose to confront a seemingly strong part with silence is to employ a tactic. de 
Certeau (1984) distinguishes between two ways of operating, strategies and tactics. The 
concept of strategy refers to the manipulation of power relationships that becomes 
possible as soon as a subject with will and power can be isolated (de Certeau, 1984, 35-
36). In other words, strategy refers to the action that takes place in a proper, delimited and 
fixed place and that depends on a certain and specific knowledge. Military or scientific 
activities are good examples here. By contrast, ‘a tactic is a calculated action determined 
by the absence of a proper locus’ (de Certeau, 1984, 36-37). It is the action that takes 
place in a terrain that already belongs to and is organized by another power (subject, 
institution, natural force etc). Whereas strategies privilege spatial relationships which 
enable the capitalization of already acquired advantages, tactics utilize the current, the 
opportunities of the moment to take the opponent by surprise.  
 This is a formulation that relates to the event under scrutiny, but also to expressions of 
political discontent more generally, for at least two reasons. First, this distinction helps us 
to understand how participants in such practices exploit time, kairos and the opportunities 
for action offered in it, instead of seeking to localize or circumscribe political action. In 
doing so, it also exposes the fluid nature of the demos, its dependence on kairos; a demos 
can be formed and reformed when the circumstances call it. Hence the effectiveness of 
such tactical practices is contingent, it remains depended on the kairos; not all silent 
protests generate identical effects. Second, the distinction between tactics and strategies 
explains why and how tactic as way of operation is most appropriate to the weak part (de 
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Certeau, 1984, 37). In the context of political activism ‘the weak’ can be affirmed as those 
who can not make use of institutional frameworks or formal schemas, either because they 
do not have access to them, or because they find these insufficient for their aims. Rather 
than acting based on a planned, general strategy, a tactic allows one to operate in isolated 
actions. Similar to the logic of an insurgency, a tactic does not have a plan; it is the plan, in 
the sense that it is meaningful regardless of its aims and proposals (Arditi, 2012).  
 A protest in the form of ‘keeping silent’ is a tactic in a dual sense. First, in the sense that 
it is an action that is performed in a non-proper locus, that is a locus that is already 
determined by an exterior power which the agents of silence cannot control. The tactic of 
silence is exercised, it is performed, in a territory that is managed by an institution (in the 
case under discussion the University) and is under surveillance by its forces (the campus 
police). The purpose of the tactic is not to acquire the control of the territory, but to achieve 
an unexpected blow, a move that is not already anticipated. As such, ‘keeping silent’ as a 
choice of political activism can be tactical in another sense; that of being the art of the 
weak party, of the party that deploys its power in the territory established by another party 
(de Certeau, 1984, 40). In this sense it is a trick, an artifice employed by those who wish to 
declare a demand to those in a higher rank, but at the same time they seek to do so while 
challenging the very mechanisms that these subjects accept, sustain and reproduce. 
Silence as political tactic is a means to startle a political opponent but also to challenge 
institutional power using a form of civil protest. Its effectiveness remains always dependent 
on the particular occasion in which it is employed and which it addresses and transforms. 
Silence as political tactic has certain limits.        
  
Tactical Silence as Critical Practice 
Tactical silence in political life is a critical practice, in the sense that it is a pattern of 
political engagement that manifests an alternative possibility of being and acting. It is a 
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practice that molds political subjectivity, whereas it functions as exemplary to others. I 
draw this understanding of critical practice from Norval (2011, 218). A critical practice is 
one that makes one intelligible both to oneself and to others, while being irreducible either 
to reason-giving or to moral reasoning. By contrast, a critical practice is an embodied 
practice that involves ‘staging, conveying and manifesting for another a way of life, which 
exceeds as well as precedes (although it may include) argument and conversation’ 
(Norval, 2011, 213). That said, even though these latter modes of engagement may well 
serve the purposes of manifestation and provocation, they do not exhaust the possibilities 
of staging a political demand or of embodying the forms of political subjectification. Logos, 
speech acts and argumentation are not enough to perform these functions.  
 Like the practices that Norval addresses in her work, namely parrēsia and ‘turning’, 
‘keeping silent’ is also a critical practice in that it can ‘draw the self to further selves, 
empowering subjects both to act differently and to imagine alternative worlds’ (Norval, 
2011, 222). An essential aspect of these processes is the manifestation of these 
alternative ways of acting for others. However, manifesting alternatives for another in the 
case of ‘keeping silent’ is not to be understood in the sense of instruction and is therefore 
less closer to the function of ‘turning’ and closer to that of parrēsia (Norval, 2011, 218-
221). That said, ‘keeping silent’ in political life is not a pedagogical process that aims to 
teach or enchain someone (in this case Katehi); rather, it is a non-verbal ritual, a mode of 
proclaiming an injustice by someone weak to the powerful person who committed it 
(Foucault, 2010, 133). Tactical silence is a (paradoxical) mode of addressing one, of 
speaking freely to someone in power. In this sense, silence can be ultimately violent; not 
just because like parrēsia it says something in a peremptory and definitive way (Foucault, 
2010, 54), provoking and disturbing, but also because it denotes contempt, disdain to the 
opponent. It violates one’s authority by contempting it in a manner that cannot be 
penalized or directly confronted, unless in an authoritative way: by using more violence.       
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 Tactical silence is also a critical practice in a second sense. It is a form of operation 
developed by a fleeting subjectivity, rather than a crystallized manner of political behaving 
or a solid political identity; there are limits to the act of ‘keeping silent’. The reason is that if 
‘keeping silent’ becomes crystallized or solidified as practice it runs the risk of losing its 
ability to speak, to transmit messages. It ceases being disruptive and transformative and 
becomes part of the routinized everydayness it seeks to challenge. Silence is not lethargy 
but it can become such.  
Neither is silence political in itself. But it has political potentiality, when as form of 
operating enables a subjective to be responsive to the current, to kairos. Foucault (2007, 
42) argues that the essence of critique is not saying that things - ‘what exists’, ‘what one 
knows’, ‘what one does’ - are not right as they are; rather, it is a matter of questioning our 
own knowledge and its limits (2007, 49). In the context discussed here, the choice to ‘keep 
silent’ as political activism is a way of acting critically, that is a way of challenging our 
accepted assumptions, grids of knowledge and power and therefore modes of thought; it is 
a way of questioning the ‘mechanisms of different types of coercion’ in effect (Foucault, 
2007, 59). Critical silence transcends established manners of political conduct, expands 
the horizon of political activism and rearranges power relations, by manifesting neglected, 
unexpected and previously unexamined forms of political engagement.  
    
‘Keeping Silent’ as Democratic Activism   
Silence functions constitutively (Ferguson, 2003, 58). In the fitting occasion it can function 
to unite a heterogenous constituency around a fugitive commonality, thus constituting it as 
political subject, as demos. As a tactic it does not necessarily aim to disrupt everyday life in 
the way that a massive demonstration blocks traffic or alters city life; yet it revitalizes and 
transforms it by disrupting one’s senses. Thus understood, the modality of silence discussed 
here is not the outcome of mechanisms of silencing, such as censorship or exclusion; it is 
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not to be perceived as disempowerment (Ferguson, 2003; Jungkurz, 2012). Rather, as 
tactical and critical practice ‘keeping silent’ is a deliberate political choice that aims to 
address a particular occasion by transforming it. The students at UC Davis did not just sit 
on the quad, remaining speechless because they had no words to say while the Chancellor 
was passing by. They chose to keep silent because they saw in silence a way of addressing 
her: an alternative mode of political engagement. They saw in ‘keeping silent’ a way to startle 
their political opponent by acting in a surprising, unexpected manner. This experience 
comes to disturb the prevailing assumption that the means to attain freedom through political 
participation is voice.v  
 ‘Keeping silent’ as a form of civil protest does not bear the element of defense; this is not 
the kind of silence that one keeps in order to attend carefully to something or someone, like 
the demos in ancient Athens (Zumbrunnen, 2008). The silence of the students at UC Davis 
does not insinuate patience and consideration; it is demanding and dynamic. This emergent 
demos has already heard enough; its silence is its own way to be heard. This is not to 
neglect the relation between listening and silence; silence functions necessarily as a 
prerequisite for voice, for being heard. However, the modality of silence visited here is 
characterized more by intrusiveness, even ferocity, rather than by attentiveness. 
 The mute power of tactical silence is illustrated in a story that that draws on the well-
known myth of Odysseus’ encounter with the Sirens. The hero asks his crew to plug their 
ears with wax and bind him to the mast so that he could be exposed to and indulge in their 
song, yet not succumb to it. Kafka offers us a subversive reading of the myth, one where 
the central figure is no longer Odysseus but the Sirens. He writes: ‘the Sirens have a still 
more fatal weapon than their song, namely their silence. And though admittedly such a thing 
never happened, it is still conceivable that someone might possibly have escaped from their 
singing; but from their silence certainly never’ (Kafka, 1995, 430-1). In Kafka’s reading of 
the myth, the Sirens decide not to give their voice and thus to surprise their opponent by 
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doing the unexpected, the unpredictable. It is not their weakness that urges them to do so, 
but their intention to explicate an alternative yet equally powerful mode of action. The Sirens 
used their silence to startle their enemy, like the students startled Katehi. There is an 
appealing, almost magnetic, quality in silence.  
 As this illustration further suggests, to take action and intervene in order to alter a situation 
does not necessarily entail the use of noise or voice. Their absence can also be effective, 
in so far as one capitalizes upon the situation, takes advantage of the occasion, exploits and 
channels it to the benefit of the cause she supports. In choosing silence over utterance or 
noise, the students at UC Davis didn’t choose to turn their back to injustice; rather, they 
chose to provoke the source of injustice in the most disturbing and irritating way, like the 
student provokes the teacher when the latter demands an explanation that never comes. 
The receivers of silence who interpret it as a sign of resignation and weakness and thus as 
favoring themselves, experience even more surprisingly the shocking tactics of silence: it is 
a powerful weapon that cannot be fought, since there is nothing to fight. ‘Keeping silent’ as 
political activism is an embedded political choice: previous experience of injustice, old 
grievances and traumas participate in this ear-piercingly quiet outburst. Yet, it remains 
pertinent to the particular occasion, which it seeks to address in the most powerful, 
disturbing way, since the wax is not enough to help one avoid it. 
 
Disturbing Binaries 
Silence is eloquent, at least in the sense that it provides a mode of communication and 
significance (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 188). At the same time, its paradoxical and ambiguous 
nature blurs the way we understand and receive, unless it is placed in the context of the 
silence/voice binary. John Cage (1961, 8) narrates his experience in an anechoic chamber, 
where although he is supposed to be exposed to pure silence, he could still hear the sounds 
of his nervous system and the circulation of his blood; there is no such a thing as pure 
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silence. When the students at UC Davis proclaimed an injustice by employing the tactic of 
‘keeping silent’, they conveyed an argument without finding recourse to voice. Not that the 
aural element is absent during the event; the sound of the flash bulbs and of the heels of 
the Chancellor on the pavement participate in the aesthetic formation of the scene. Yet, 
these sounds underline an otherwise quiet moment and they make it even more powerful 
through a contrast of the absence of speech and the reign of other sounds. The impossibility 
of pure silence strengthens, rather than downplays, its eloquent character.  
 The tactic of ‘keeping silent’ comes to problematize our understanding of silence explicitly 
within the grid of the binary logic of silence/voice. The silent subject does not utter. Yet, she 
expresses contempt, proclaims an injustice, forwards a demand. The fact that silence does 
not articulate entails that it remains open to different meanings and interpretations; a silent 
event is multilayered. But as Glenn (2004, 4) puts it, silence is an absence with a function. 
Silence and eloquence are interwoven.  
  That silence is intertwined with speech is indicative of the complexity of the social and 
political world. By attending to this complexity and therefore to the fact that the components 
of dualisms such as silence/speech are not exclusionary of each other, but intermeshed, we 
also become attentive to the interlayered nature of democratic activism. Nietzsche (1966) 
demonstrates how the ‘opposition of values’ is merely an estimate or provisional perspective 
and he questions even the existence of opposites. He, thus, urges us to avoid placing the 
components of dualisms into an axiological relation that would end up at the exclusion of 
one over the other; instead, he suggests we ought to perceive them as participating in a 
complex relation of operating differences, a relation which they inform, shape and redefine. 
They participate in an expanding relation of inclusion rather than exclusion. Silence is 
interwoven with language. It may be its prerequisite, by enveloping language, making it 
possible (Merleau-Ponty, 1969, 176), but it is not its opposite. Speech does not exclude 
silence; the latter already includes the former.  
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One should not be over-optimistic with regard to the effect of disturbing binaries: the fact 
that it is possible to downplay their significance by redefining the relation between their 
components does not entail that it is possible to abandon binaries altogether. Deleuze (2007, 
34) reminds us that binaries are inevitable because ‘they are already in language’. The 
question, therefore, is not how we ‘get rid of them’ but rather how we ‘fight against’ binaries 
by making language ‘flow between’ them. Deleuze points to the technique of stammering as 
one way of fighting against binaries. By inserting new elements, even repetitive ones, we 
can disrupt a flow and give room for emergence of new constituents, and therefore of new 
possibilities of being and acting. ‘Keeping silent’ functions in a similar way, in so far as it is 
a way to break a certain flow – the flow of our perception of political argumentation and 
participation as associated with speech – and to give rise to a new possibility of ‘being 
politically’. A being that does not utter, yet proclaims, demands and attains.  
 In a similar vein, one should not overestimate the productive forces of ‘keeping silent’, 
either. As a tactic, it does not have the transformative power of, say, a total revolution; 
neoliberalism could not be fought against by deploying a silent protest. Yet, by breaking the 
logic of binary thinking, it is a practice that softens one’s understanding of political activism, 
enabling a deeper affirmation of what counts as meaningful and effective political practice. 
In this way, it broadens one’s understanding of democracy itself, as that form of politics that 
is always in emergence, responding to everyday emergencies of maintenance (Honig, 2009, 
xvii). Democracy is reduced neither to radical ‘events’ nor to what can be called ‘everyday 
politics’; such a crude dichotomization invalidates our appreciation of the ordinariness folded 
in politics. After all, as Norval puts it, ‘not all novelty is a radical break, neither is all tradition 
a mere repetition of the same’ (2007, 12). Democracy and activism are open, complex and 
ongoing processes. 
  The silent subject is merely one among diverse possible forms of political subjectivity. 
Although it disturbs the prevailing equation of democratic subjectivity with the speaking 
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subject, manifesting an alternative way of acting and challenging established power 
relations, it is an appearance of political agency that acquires its meaningfulness from 
kairos, from the particular occasion. And it does so to the degree that it can function to 
provoke, question and even startle a political opponent with more power, opening thus a 
space for political intervention where previously there seemed to be an impasse. 
 
Conclusions 
 The proliferation of means of political participation and activism that we experience 
in the 21st century suggests that the politics of choice replaces the politics of loyalties 
(Norris, 2002: 4). This paper made the case for ‘keeping silent’ as one choice of political 
action among others, acknowledging also its limits. Silence is here defended as tactic, rather 
than as crystallized pattern of behavior. Hence the affirmation of its situational character.  
 Events such as the one that took place at UC Davis help us affirm the complexity and 
richness of political life. They allow us to receive less predictable encounters as meaningful 
forms of political intervention. The silent event under scrutiny exemplifies the argument that 
to ‘keep silent’ does not always come as the result of a process of ‘being silenced’; those 
who ‘keep silent’ are not necessarily disempowered, inaudible or invisible. They are neither 
apathetic nor ignorant; the students at UC Davis chose to be silent because they perceived 
their refusal to utter as a means to express disapproval or disavowal of a political decision 
made against them by those having a form of power that the students didn’t have access to. 
‘Keeping silent’ is not a practice of despair or the last recourse of those who feel otherwise 
weakened and ready to quit; it is a choice not of those who believe that they have nothing 
to say, but of those who find in this practice a way to bring about change. It is a tactic 
employed by those who want not only to demand something from those in a higher rank, but 
who also want to challenge the very mechanisms that these pundits accept and use. 
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 Silence functions at different layers; yet, there is always something that remains 
imperceptible in the meaning of silence. It is multifarious and polysemic, and therefore too 
fleeting to fully grasp its denotations. It acquires its meaningfulness from kairos, from the 
particular circumstances amidst which it is employed. As political tactic, it does not merely 
create new channels for argumentation; it also shows how these need not be reduced to 
verbal forms of communication.  As such, silent political activism raises awareness of 
political injustices, stimulates political thinking and invites a broadening of political 
sensitivities. As critical practice, ‘keeping silent’ enriches the possible forms of political 
subjectification, thus expending the horizon of political participation to those who find in 
language inadequate a means to proclaim political demands. In this sense, ‘keeping silent’ 
is a way of creating and winning new audiences for political claims. It is a way of acting upon 
one’s perception.  
 Silent political activism deserves our attention, not because it carries hidden messages 
that need to be decrypted, but because it exposes in the most profound and disturbing way 
the pervasiveness of injustice in human societies. By inviting new political audiences, it 
creates new political bodies and challenges established power mechanisms, in ways that 
are disturbing, yet remain difficult to be challenged back.  
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Notes
i The event quickly went viral and can be watched on popular sites like YouTube 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nmfIuKelOt4) and Vimeo (http://vimeo.com/60599729). 
ii This is one dimension presented in several blogs, for example 
http://thesecondalarm.com/2011/11/20/ucdavis-chancellor-video/  
iii The diverse network of the Women In Black, with its members occasionally organizing silent protests or 
vigils, would be a notable example here.‘Women in Black is a world-wide network of women committed to 
peace with justice and actively opposed to injustice, war, militarism and other forms of violence’, from the 
movement’s official website http://www.womeninblack.org. See also Göker (2011) who  offers a gendered 
analysis of the silent vigils organized by mothers of Turkey every Saturday.  
iv Following the students’ protest, the judicial settlement of the pepper-spray case ordered that victims should 
receive $1 million compensation, whereas Katehi herself was asked to provide written apology. 
v For an analysis of the relationship between freedom and silence from a Foucauldian perspective see 
Wendy Brown (2005) ‘Freedom’s silences’, in Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 83-97. 
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